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Abstract 
This paper analyses post-war coping strategies by farm households in developing countries. 
The analysis is based on a portfolio model of activity choices in war-affected rural Sub-
Saharan Africa. A case study using farm household survey data estimates the determinants of 
agricultural coping strategies in post-war Mozambique. Post-war coping strategies are 
expected to differ from pre- and mid-crisis coping strategies. War-affected households are 
forced to adopt very risky coping strategies that re-enforce their vulnerability. Households 
choose between market and non-market forms of exchange and even exit markets entirely. 
Post-war reconstruction policy should focus on re-capitalizing households and providing 
public goods. 
1 Introduction 
The traditional coping strategy literature has focused on household activity choices leading up 
to, and during, natural disasters and famine. In contrast, this paper analyses post-war coping 
strategies by farm households in developing countries. The analysis is based on a model of 
farm household behavior which is derived from portfolio theory (Bodie and Merton 1998; 
Dixit 1990). The model considers the special circumstances of conflict in rural Sub-Saharan 
Africa, which are akin to a land abundant tropical economy (Binswanger and McIntire 1987). 
Initial contributions to the literature on coping strategies analyzed responses to drought and 
famine (Corbett 1988; Reardon, Matlon and Delgado 1998). A related literature studied 
activity choices and income diversification (Ellis 2000; Reardon, Delgado and Matlon 1992). 
These choices are affected by household size and endowments (Abdulai and Delgado 1999; 
Taylor and Yunez-Naude 2000; von Braun and Pandya-Lorch 1991), by social institutions 
and property rights (Carter and Olinto 2003; Fafchamps and Lund 2003; Platteau 1999), by 
formal and informal markets or by their absence (de Janvry, Fafchamps and Sadoulet 1991; 
Key, Sadoulet and de Janvry 2000; Leonard 2000; Liedholm, McPherson and Chuta 1994) 
and by location and geography (Dercon and Krishnan 1996; Goetz 1992). Coping strategies 
include the decision of whether to engage in markets at all (Binswanger and McIntire 1987), 
the choice of crop or production technique (Sperling and Longley 2002; von Braun and 
Kennedy 1994) and non-market forms of risk diversification (Blarel, et al. 1992; Dercon and 
Krishnan 2000). Policy makers are concerned about activity choices and their impact on rural 
poverty (Adams 2002; Dercon 2002), or as a means of mitigating the negative effects of 
disasters (Sperling and Longley 2002; Webb and von Braun 1994). The traditional literature 
has not, however, considered coping strategies and activity diversification in situations of 
war. In fact, there is very little analysis to date of the micro-economic behavior of farm 
2 households in times of conflict. Hence the analysis of coping strategies after war is the unique 
contribution of this paper. 
A case study using farm household survey data estimates the determinants of agricultural 
coping strategies in post-war Mozambique. There is a lively debate on income diversification 
and cash crop adoption in Mozambique (Cramer and Pontara 1998; Heltberg and Tarp 2002; 
Pitcher 1998; Tschirley and Benfica 2001; Tschirley and Weber 1994). Another literature 
records the economic effect of the devastating civil war in Mozambique (Addison and de 
Sousa 1999; de Sousa 2003; Wuyts 2003). This article differs from that literature by focusing 
on the long-term effects of war on farm household production choices. 
The analysis demonstrates that post-war coping strategies differ from pre- and mid-crisis 
coping strategies. War-affected households have a higher demand for risk diversification yet 
they may be severely constrained in their activity choices. Such households are forced to 
adopt very risky coping strategies that re-enforce their vulnerability. Households choose 
between market and non-market forms of exchange and even consider exiting markets 
entirely, an option not often considered by basic models of farm household behavior. These 
findings have strong implications for post-war reconstruction policies. 
The paper is structured as follows. The next sections develop a formal model of household 
coping strategies with two risky income activities and discuss the effects of war in the model. 
The subsequent section introduces the case study, reviews methodological and data issues and 
derives the econometric specifications. This is followed by a discussion of some summary 
statistics, the econometric results and policy implications. The last section concludes. 
A Model of the Determinants of Coping Strategy 
This section develops a simple model of the choice between two coping strategies. Activity or 
coping strategies refer to the household labor allocation between different income generating 
3 tasks. The main activity distinctions are between on- and off-farm (or agricultural and non-
agricultural) activities and between subsistence and market activities. 
Consider a farm household with two production activities i = 1 or 2. (The model can be 
generalized to more than two activities.) Assume that land is abundant so that there are no 
credit or labor markets: the total labor supply equals household labor supply L. Asset 
endowments of households are given in each period and are normalized at 1. The main risk in 
household production derives from V, the variance of portfolio revenue net of costs: 
 V  =  s1
2 - 2q(s1
2 + s12) + q
2(s1
2 + s2
2 - 2s12) (1) 
 s 12 =  ρ12s1s2 
where q is the share of labor dedicated to activity 1, si is the standard deviation of the return 
of the i
th activity (for i = 1 or 2), s12 is the covariance of returns between the two activities 1 
and 2, and ρ12 is the correlation coefficient of the returns from both activities. This yields: 
  ∂V/∂q =  -2s1
2 + 2qs1
2 + 2qs2
2 + 2s12 - 4qs12 
  ∂V/∂q =  -2s1
2 < 0  (for ρ = 0 and q = 0) 
  ∂V/∂q =  2s2
2 > 0  (for ρ = 0 and q = 1) 
  ∂
2V/∂q
2 =  2s1
2 + 2s2
2 - 4s12 
  ∂
2V/∂q
2  > 0  (for ρ = 0) 
 q Vmin =  s1
2 / (s1
2 + s2
2) (for  ρ = 0) 
where qVmin denotes the share of labor allocated to the second activity such that total portfolio 
risk is minimized. Total farm production X is defined as: 
 X  =  X1(L1) + X2(L2)   (2) 
    = a1q1 + a2q2 
 L  ≤ L1 + L2   (3) 
where ai is the activity-specific constant returns to scale (CRS) production technology. Total 
farm revenue net of variable, non-labor inputs R is given by: 
 R  =  R1 + R2 
   =  p1\X1 + p2X2   (4) 
4 where pi are farm-gate output prices. Farm-gate prices are net of transaction costs ti so that: 
 p i =  pi* - ti   (5) 
where pi* are given wholesale market prices. Transaction costs for each commodity are 
determined by given household characteristics and market imperfections. This implies that 
commodity prices and commodity market failure are household-specific. 
At the beginning of the agricultural year, a household allocates its labor supply L between 
activities for given expected revenues, preferences, endowments and local climatic 
conditions: 
 E(R) =  E(p1)E(X1) + E(p2)E(X2) 
   =  E(p1)a1(1-q) + E(p2)a2q 
   =  E(p1)a1 - qE(p1)a1 + qE(p2)a2 (6) 
 q  =  q2 
   =  L2 / L    (7) 
and where E(.) denotes the expectations operator. 
The subjective wage W for household labor is defined as the amount of output a household 
would require as compensation for a given unit of leisure foregone. This is captured here 
through the subjective wage rate w such that total subjective equilibrium labor costs per 
household are: 
 W  =  wL    (8) 
   =  wL1 + wL2 
These wage costs are affected by the specific household characteristics, which define the 
dependency ratio and thus the leisure-work trade-off. Total household profits Π are defined as 
revenue net of subjective labor costs: 
  Π  = R - W    (9) 
so that expected profits are: 
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 E(Π)  = E(R) - W    (10) The rate of return π of the activity portfolio is then given by: 
  π =  Π/R 
    = 1 - (W / R)    (11) 
  ∂π/∂R  > 0 and ∂
2π/∂R
2 < 0 
The expected rate of return is thus given by: 
 E(π)  = 1 - (W / E(R))    (12) 
The farm household utility function U contains two elements: one representing expected 
portfolio profits and one representing the expected portfolio risk: 
 U  =  U(Π, V)    (13) 
  ∂U/∂Π > 0, ∂
2U/∂Π
2 < 0, ∂U/∂V < 0 and ∂
2U/∂V
2 > 0 
Households maximize utility with respect to the labor allocation subject to the labor 
constraint: 
  max U  = U(Π, V) 
 w.r.t.  q 
 s.t.  0  ≤ q ≤ 1    (14) 
Assuming ρ = 0 and additive utility, this is solved as follows: 
  U  = R - W - V 







  ∂U/∂q  = - p1a1 + p2a2 + 2s1
2 - 2qs1
2 - 2qs2
2 = 0 
  ∂
2U/∂q
2  = - 2s1
2 - 2qs2
2 < 0 
so that this utility function, with a negative sign of the risk aversion parameter U’’/U’, implies 
risk aversion. Rearranging the first order condition yields: 




   ≥ 0 
   ≤ 1 
The numerator of equation 16 is negative and the denominator is positive such that: 
  ∂q/∂p1 < 0, ∂q/∂p2 > 0, ∂q/∂a1 < 0, ∂q/∂a2 > 0, 
6   ∂q/∂s1 > 0, ∂q/∂s2 < 0, ∂q/∂t1 > 0 and ∂q/∂t2 < 0 
Assuming additive utility is non-trivial as a multiplicative functional form would result in a 
different specification of q: 
 U  =  Π / V    (17) 
  ∂U/∂q =  (∂Π/∂q V - Π ∂V/∂q) / V
2 = 0 
where the first order condition also includes a term for profits and thus for the subjective 
wage. This implies that for farm household production in the absence of labor markets and 
with no riskless activity to engage in, household preferences affect the optimal allocation of 
resources between risky activities through both the profit and the utility functions. This result 
does not hold for households facing perfect markets and a riskless investment opportunity. 
This model differs from standard models of farm production under uncertainty by 
emphasizing the absence of labor and output markets, the existence of a survival constraint, 
and the role of the subjective valuation of labor. 
Figure 1 summarizes the model where quadrant I plots the profit function (equation 12), 
quadrant III plots the production function (equation 6), quadrant IV plots the risk function 
(equation 1) and quadrant II plots the utility function (equation 13) in risk-return space. 
Quadrant II also summarizes the trade-off between risk and return in the activity portfolio. 
Households prefer higher expected returns and lower portfolio risk so that U3 > U2 > U1. At 
point a, q = 1 and the household specializes in activity 2. At point d, q = 0 and the household 
specializes in activity 1. At point c, the portfolio has the lowest possible risk Vmin and q = 
qVmin. Curve abc represents the efficient portfolio frontier. 
Equilibrium is obtained at point b where abcd is tangential to the highest possible utility curve 
U2. The equilibrium level of q is q* which is larger than qVmin (figure 1). The household will 
thus decide at the beginning of the agricultural season to allocate q* of its labor to activity 2 
and 1 - q* to activity 1. The expected shares of revenue from activities 2 and 1 are therefore 
7 q* and 1 - q*, respectively. Given the prevalent uncertainty, these labor allocation and 
expected revenue shares are only approximate indicators of the actual output shares per 
activity at the end of the period. Note that more risk averse households would choose a labor 
allocation closer to qVmin. 
War and Coping Strategies 
This section outlines the effects of war on the basic model of activity choices. The nature and 
the determinants of coping strategies during and after conflict will be discussed. 
War has three effects on the risk-risk relationship of the basic model (equation 1). First, the 
increase in overall risk due to war will shift the whole curve right (∂V/∂si > 0) with the war 
legacy ensuring that the post-war outcome will still be to the right of the pre-war case. 
Second, the relative changes in risks (say ∆s1
2/∆s2
2 < 1) will shift the lower section of the 
curve even further to the right (∂V/∂s2 = 2q
2s2). With a large q, an increasing s2 leads to a 
further increase in V. This effect is reduced in the post-war period. Third, the increase in the 
correlation coefficient flattens the slope near qVmin (∂(∂V/∂q)/∂s12 = 2-4q) thus reducing the 
scope for risk reduction through portfolio diversification. In the post-war period, there is still 
a higher correlation coefficient though its scale may be lower than during the war. The net 
effect of the changes is that, during war, the curve abcd shifts down and to the right to an area 
of unambiguously lower utility for the household. In the post-war period, the curve will shift 
partially back towards the peace-time position (2). 
War will change the profit function (equation 9) by affecting revenue and the equilibrium 
value of the subjective wage, in particular via enforced life-cycle effects in the household. 
This is most likely to occur through conflict-related morbidity and mortality in the household, 
especially in households near the survival threshold. If disaster is imminent, then W will be 
low and the risk of production and correlation coefficient of returns are likely to be very high, 
8 thus reducing the potential gain from diversification. In the post-war period, households may 
remain in such high risk, near starvation equilibrium, depending how quickly the value of 
subjective wages can rise under peace conditions. Given strong war effects, many households 
may exist in the post-war poverty trap in the bottom right corner of quadrant IV in figure 2. 
This model can therefore resolve the apparent paradox noted in the safety-first literature 
where destitute households engage in very risky behavior even though they are least able to 
withstand the risks inherent in such a portfolio. It does so by valuing the trade-off between 
leisure and labor in regard to the survival constraint through the term W, which captures the 
household consumption requirements. 
Household assets and social capital affect the technical efficiency of production and hence ai. 
With land abundance and damaged credit markets, assets fulfill a key role as both productive 
inputs and as a self-insurance mechanism in a risky environment. At the same time, assets are 
key targets of soldiers and looters. Asset characteristics thus make some activities more 
vulnerable to war than others. For example, cattle herding may be a productive and a risk-
mitigating activity in peace-times. Nevertheless, cattle herding becomes unfeasible in a long-
lasting war of destabilization and may not be worthwhile (due to an expected resumption of 
hostilities) or possible (due to the collapse of cattle markets and extension services) in a high 
risk, poor post-war environment. Households depend on their land and their social capital for 
production and social exchange. The portfolio of endowments therefore affects the portfolio 
of activities undertaken. 
The model implies that war-affected households facing substantial market constraints smooth 
consumption by smoothing income. This result does not obtain in the standard farm 
household model. Households affected by war hence behave differently from households in 
peace-time economies. Rural post-war reconstruction policies must support these income 
9 smoothing activities while helping to re-establish markets to allow once again consumption 
smoothing. 
War also affects production technologies and relative prices so that both ai and pi in equations 
2 and 4 can be expected to fall. In the case of food crops (i=1) versus cash crops (i=2), it is 
also likely that ∆a1/∆a2 < 1 and ∆p1/∆p2 < 1, as war increases the transaction costs for cash 
crops relatively more than for food crops and as cash crops have a given world price. In 
addition, war is likely to enforce the extended use of traditional cropping patterns, seeds and 
techniques. To the extent that these techniques are more divisible than modern agronomic 
practices (irrigation being an extreme example of an indivisible modern technique), 
households adopt a larger number of individual activities within each activity class during the 
war while reducing the dependence on cash crops. Such traditional techniques include the 
number of traditional food crops, dividing the cultivated area per household into more but 
smaller plots and pursuing intensive-intensive off-farm activities. 
In terms of figure 2, a proportionate reduction of the parameters pi and ai will shift the E(R) 
curve to the right in quadrant III. A disproportionately large reduction of the p2 and a2 
parameters will also reduce the slope of the curve. These war-induced changes in the 
technology and price variables may only be reversed partially in the post-war period. 
Household activity diversification is also encouraged by institutional and market 
imperfections, which are worsened by war. Such imperfections affect the degree of 
technology embedded in production (ai) and the farm-gate prices (pi) net of transaction costs 
(ti). The total labor availability (L) is also shaped by market imperfections, especially through 
increased search, information and supervision costs in land abundant areas which lead to 
reduced supply of and demand for labor and hence to the breakdown of wage labor markets. 
Consequently, the variables L, w and W in equation 8 are shaped by the effects of war on 
institutions. 
10 Household social capital is a key determinant of the profitability of low-return, off-farm 
activities, including social exchange and NGO donations. Households with higher social 
capital (for example households who hold a position of traditional authority in their 
community) are thus much more likely to command larger labor resources L, have lower 
transaction costs ti and achieve higher net prices for off-farm activities p2. 
Formal and even informal credit markets may cease to exist during war. This is due to the 
high cost of information gathering, the reduced ability to enforce contracts while state 
authority is so severely threatened and the high degree of risk covariance which increases the 
undiversifiable portfolio risk for lenders. Credit-constrained households are thus likely to 
increase their share of informal, social, non-market activities to substitute for war-affected 
credit markets. 
Given the reduced number of feasible choices under war conditions, there is an externality 
effect of household market withdrawal. At the margin, one more household reducing its 
market participation will prevent all other households from joining a market. This effect is 
particularly pronounced if households’ transaction costs are uniformly affected by the war, 
creating a high covariance of risks, and covariant household activity choices. This is a further 
reason for market breakdown in war conditions. 
Volatile markets increase the incentives for households to engage in subsistence activities. 
“Village enclaves” (Dasgupta 1993: 235) are more pronounced in a post-war environment and 
location will be a strong determinant of household behavior. These effects may create village-
level poverty traps, from which no individual household can endogenously free itself. 
The Case of Mozambique 
Rural Mozambique provides a suitable case study for war-affected coping strategies as it 
experienced a devastating civil war until 1992. For example, the number of cattle in 
11 Mozambique declined from over 1.3 million in 1982 to 0.25 million in 1992 (Ministério da 
Agricultura 1994). Farm productivity in the post-war period continued to remain well below 
regional averages (Tschirley and Weber 1994) while per capita food production only reached 
90 percent of its pre-war level by 1996 (World Bank 2002). In 1995, gross domestic product 
per capita was only 146 US dollars (World Bank 2002) and in the Human Development Index 
Mozambique ranked among the ten least developed countries in the world (UNDP 1999). 
The north of Mozambique is often considered the “green belt” of the country. However, post-
war agricultural production was hampered by poor transport networks and the absence of 
irrigation infrastructure and of mechanized agricultural production. There were few 
agricultural or non-agricultural employment opportunities and no migrant workers and no 
formal credit markets. 
The farm household survey used for this analysis includes 371 randomly selected households 
in 16 villages (the primary sampling units, PSU) in three districts in Nampula and Cabo 
Delgado provinces in northern Mozambique (MAP/MSU Research Team 1996). The findings 
of the survey are broadly representative of the more accessible parts of northern Mozambique. 
The sample was stratified according to households’ cotton growing status. The survey data, 
here denoted FSP, was collected by the Food Security Project at the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Maputo, from June 1994 to January 1996. All variables below will refer to the year 1995 
unless stated otherwise. The variables are summarized in figure 2. The FSP survey is one of 
the most carefully designed, collected, and cleaned rural household surveys from the early 
post-war period in Mozambique. The evidence provided by the FSP survey is complemented 
by qualitative data collected during two visits to northern Mozambique in 1995 and 1999. 
Specification Issues 
Equation 16 defines the functional form for q as: 




where q must lie in the interval 0 to 1. The equilibrium determinants of q are closely related to 
the independent parameters pi, ai and si
2. Depending on the functional form of the utility 
function, q also depends on ρij and W. This implies that subjective wages and household 
endowments matter for activity choices. Furthermore, war requires controlling for the 
subjective valuation of leisure and household- and village-level transaction costs (equation 5). 
Taking q as an indicator of activity choices and replacing the model parameters pi, ai, si
2, ρij, 
and W with corresponding household survey indicators thus yields the reduced-form 
equation: 
 q i =  α0 + α1Li + α2Fi + α3Ki + α4V + ei (18) 
where  Li,  Fi,  Ki, and V are vectors representing household, land, asset endowments and 
village-level characteristics, respectively, and where ei is an error term which is not correlated 
with the exogenous variables thus yielding unbiased and consistent estimates for the vectors 
of coefficients αh for households i = 1…N and groups of coefficients αh for h = 0…4. 
Equation 18 is not restricted to a specific functional form and may thus be guided by 
theoretical considerations, practical experience and statistical tests. A priori considerations 
and experience suggest mainly linear, log-linear and quadratic forms for the independent 
vectors Li, Fi, Ki, and V. This specification thus corresponds closely to those used in the 
literature on household income diversification (Reardon, Delgado and Matlon 1992). 
Some of the decisions, for example to participate in markets or to adopt cotton, are discrete 
choices which cannot be modeled with the linear approach. Instead, assume that a household 
participates in a market if it considers it to be a profitable move such that: 
 q i = 1 if πi > 0    (19) 
 q i = 0 otherwise 
13 where πi is the expected rate of profitability of market participation for household i = 1…N. 
Furthermore, assume that the profitability of the activity is determined by a model akin to that 
of equation 18. The binary model to be estimated is then: 
 Prob  (qi = 1) = 
 F  (α0 + α1Li + α2Fi + α3Ki + α4V) (20) 
where F is a cumulative probability function closely related to equation 18. This model can be 
estimated by logit or probit, if the error term follows a logistic or normal distribution, 
respectively. Such a model thus estimates the probability that a household undertakes a 
certain activity given the household’s endowments, preferences and the prevailing prices. 
Following Cramer and Ridder (1991), a binary (not a multiple-category) variable was adopted 
for this analysis to capture the essential difference between no market participation on the one 
hand and some form of market participation on the other hand. 
One interpretation of q in equation 18 is as the share of net household income from 
agricultural activities (SHAREON). The share of subsistence (i.e. non-market) income is 
denoted 1 - q (SHARESUB) and the share of market income q. The categorical variable 
STATUS3 identifies households which have some degree of crop market participation, 
defined by the value of crops sold in the market. Other variables break output market 
participation down into sub-groups such as “selling food crops only”, “selling cash crops 
only” and “selling food and cash crops” (STATUS2), where cash crops are defined as 
inedible crops. The categorical variable COTTON measures whether households plant any 
cotton at all, which implies q > 0 in the model above. 
One non-monetary and non-market indicator of household diversification is PLOTFRAG, 
which measures the degree of spatial diversification of farm households or farm 
fragmentation. Formally, PLOTFRAG is defined as the natural log of the weighted 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of plot diversification: 
14   HHI = 1 / ( ∑ qi
2 ), i = 1…N  (21) 
where qi is the share of plot i’s area of the total cultivated area per household and N is the 
total number of plots farmed per household. The HHI is weighted by the area cultivated per 
household to allow comparisons across households irrespective of farm size. PLOTFRAG is 
almost normally distributed. 
Another measure of non-market diversification is the degree of social exchange 
(EXCHANGE). This is defined as the natural log of the sum of the absolute value of 
remittances and social exchange both given and received between January and September 
1995 (the data for the remaining three months of 1995 is incomplete). EXCHANGE measures 
the sum of the absolute values as the actual flows given and received may cancel out, which 
would underestimate the degree of social exchange. 
Results and Discussion 
Summary Statistics 
Households are very dependent on subsistence food crop activities for their income, with cash 
crops contributing only a small share to total income but three quarters of all crop marketing 
income (table 2). Entrepreneurial, wage and social income account for even smaller shares of 
household income. The high shares of on-farm income (SHAREON) and non-market income 
(SHARESUB) of total income suggest that households in northern Mozambique in 1995 were 
still practicing many of their war-time subsistence coping strategies. 
Table 3 compares these findings to those from 28 other farm surveys from Sub-Saharan 
African countries, which report lower on-farm and higher off-farm income shares. 
Interestingly, the share of social income is also higher in the other surveys, suggesting that 
war may also reduce a household’s capacity to generate social income. Other authors report 
household income shares from off-farm activities in African countries of between 30% and 
15 50% occasionally reaching 90% (Ellis 1998; Reardon 1997; von Braun and Pandya-Lorch 
1991). It is thus apparent that the share of off-farm income in the post-war FSP survey is 
particularly low. 
Household output market participation decisions were very flexible in post-war northern 
Mozambique (table 4). The FSP survey recorded crop sales for the two agricultural years 
ending 1994 and 1995. 43% of all households did not change their market participation status 
between 1994 and 1996, 20% of all households either added another type of crop or 
specialized in cash crops and 38% reduced the number of types of crops sold or even resumed 
a pure subsistence status. In fact, the total share of households marketing some cash crops 
dropped from 63% to 54% while the share of pure subsistence households increased from 
13% to 21% in one year. These figures show that households adjust their market participation 
in the face of a variety of changing constraints from year to year and that households 
differentiate their market participation decisions between food crop and cash crop markets. 
Degree of On-Farm Activities 
The SHAREON regression (table 5a) is highly significant and has a good fit with an R
2 value 
of 0.59. The positive coefficient of ANIMAL suggests that having more livestock helps to 
increase agricultural income activities. This may be related to the synergies derived from 
livestock ownership (especially in the post-war absence of commercial farm inputs like 
fertilizers) and to the war-induced absence of credit markets for off-farm activities, which 
implies that livestock plays no role as a collateral in credit transactions. 
The social capital variables are entirely insignificant. This is slightly surprising as 
investments in social institutions could be a key response by households to high post-war 
levels of uncertainty. Their insignificance may derive from three sources. First, the share of 
social income in total income is very small thus reducing the role of social institutions in 
explaining income shares. Second, social institutions may be less important than anticipated if 
16 their determinants are equal to those of market activities. In that case, market and social 
exchange are not substitutes but complements. Third, the proxies for social institutions 
included in the FSP survey may only measure such institutions imperfectly. 
Autarky versus Crop Market Participation 
The STATUS3 regression (table 5b) is highly significant. One village indicator variable was 
dropped, as that location predicted crop market participation perfectly, and 21 observations 
were not used. Households with a higher dependency ratio have a strongly reduced 
probability of crop market participation, indicating household-specific propensity to 
participate in crop markets. A higher household human capital increases market participation 
(EDUMAX, EDUMAXSQU). In a review of evidence on the effects of education in the rural 
economy, a similar effect of education was noted (Taylor and Yunez-Naude 2000). There 
appears to be no link from education to farm output but a link from education to farm activity 
choices in Africa. 
Total farm size in 1994-95 (AREATOTAL) is a highly significant factor. This result implies 
that there are fixed transaction costs of market participation. Households with larger land 
endowments may have a comparative advantage in farming, lower transaction costs of land 
acquisition or market imperfections can be better internalized by larger scale farms. Strongly 
war-affected households may thus be doubly constrained in their reconstruction efforts. First 
they have less land for farming and second they have less access to crop markets, with the 
former effect reinforcing the latter. 
The probability of crop market participation is reduced by owning more agricultural tools per 
household (TOOL) and increased by owning a larger range of agricultural tools 
(TOOLTYPE). Note that tool ownership is exogenous as households in the sample area had 
no access to markets for tools in that year. The ownership of livestock at the end of the war 
(ANIMAL) is a positive determinant of current crop market activity. Households which had 
17 been subjected to asset destruction during the war were thus damaged in their ability to rejoin 
crop markets for many years to come even after the cessation of violence. 
Degree of Subsistence Activity 
The SHARESUB regression (table 5c) is highly significant and has a good fit with an R
2 of 
0.46. A variance inflation factor (VIF) analysis does not suggest a presence of significant 
multicollinearity. The determinants of the degree of market participation (SHARESUB) differ 
significantly from those for the basic decision of whether to participate in any markets at all 
(STATUS3). For instance, the scale effect operates through household size, and hence 
lifecycle effects, and not through farm size. Female-headed households, whose market 
participation does not differ systematically from that of other households, on average have a 
share of subsistence income 11 percentage points higher than other households (FEMHEAD). 
Female-headed households enter crop markets like other households but their share of 
market-based income in total income is much lower. 
Environmental and social risks induce households to engage in market activities because 
those risks are less correlated with market risks and thus offer scope for risk diversification. 
Social and village level variables also strongly affect household market participation 
decisions. It is likely that the war increased the importance of these factors and that they will 
only slowly diminish in importance in the post-war northern Mozambican context. 
Cash Crop Adoption 
The logit regression of COTTON (table 5d) is significant with a p-value of 0.011. Educational 
variables (EDUMUM, EDUMUMSQU) are not significant determinants of cash crop 
adoption. A Ugandan farm household study found a similar absence of educational 
achievements on crop adoption (Appleton and Balihuta 1996). That study also analyzed a 
18 post-war economy, suggesting that the adoption effects of education are more limited when 
general economic circumstances are unfavorable for growth and poverty alleviation. 
Instead, the adoption of cotton in the post-war period in northern Mozambique is shaped by 
the household composition, availability and valuation of labor, by alternative investment 
opportunities and returns, and by comparative advantage as determined by local climatic and 
institutional conditions. The risk attitude and risk bearing capacity of households determine if 
households are willing to adopt cotton. Female-headed and local political status, for example, 
almost perfectly predict cotton adoption for almost 10% of the sample. A significant lifecycle 
effect occurs through the mean age of the household (AGEHH, AGEHHSQU). The war 
affects household cash crop decisions indirectly through the subjective value households 
attach to their labor, which are in part determined by a household’s experience of the recent 
war. These indirect effects of war are very difficult for public policy to remove and it is likely 
that such differences will persist over a long time. 
Plot Diversification 
The determinants of PLOTFRAG are shown in table 5e. The regression is highly significant, 
has a reasonable fit with an R
2 of 0.39 and has no apparent problem of multicollinearity as 
determined by VIF analysis. Given the significance of gender and household size coefficients, 
the household labor constraint is an important determinant of plot diversification. This finding 
is supported by interview evidence with agronomists in northern Mozambique. These 
interviews confirmed that planting fields benefited from being done quickly to utilize the best 
“window of opportunity” appropriate for that field. With more but smaller fields, households 
can spread these points in time and thus manage a larger cultivated area with a given amount 
of labor. These results confirm the hypothesis that households in the post-war period react 
strongly to some types of risks by altering their non-market production behavior. 
19 Plot diversification is also a response to life cycle effects and household endowments, with 
gender having a strong effect on plot diversification. Household assets reduce such 
diversification while some soil characteristics and social capital have less importance. Finally, 
market opportunities help reduce spatial diversification while market risks increase it. 
Households which are emerging from a position of war-induced isolation are thus clearly 
using non-market diversification strategies. 
Social Exchange 
The EXCHANGE regression (table 5f) is highly significant and has a reasonable fit (R
2 = 
0.37). A VIF analysis does not suggest the presence of multicollinearity. The result is robust 
to the omission of the zero-exchange households. Having many women (FEMALE, 
FEMALESQU) or men (MALE, MALESQU) in the household increases social exchange. 
Both effects are quadratic with minima at 4.0 and 2.7 persons, respectively. This confirms the 
dependence of rural social networks in Mozambique on very large families (Garrett and Ruel 
1999). 
Likewise, intergenerational dependence is a strong determining factor for informal social 
security mechanisms, with younger and older household heads (AGEHEAD, 
AGEHEADSQU) being more involved in transfers. The significant effects of the mean 
household age (AGEHH, AGEHHSQU) could represent the accumulation of contacts, a form 
of social capital, which is necessary in conducting exchange. 
Better asset-endowed households can afford more insurance while also being more capable of 
utilizing self-insurance mechanisms. Social exchange thus appears to be an insurance 
mechanism for better-off households. Households in which the husband comes from the local 
village (ORIGINMAN) have much lower social exchange than other households. Therefore, 
the move of husbands to the village of their wife sometime after their wedding, as is common 
20 practice in northern Mozambique, helps to build long-distance sources of remittance and 
social income. This tradition reduces the correlation of income within small areas. 
Conclusions 
The analysis demonstrated that post-war coping strategies include many different market and 
non-market activities. In the post-war period, households pursue diversified activities as a 
response to the varying war legacy and to peace-time opportunities. Post-war behavior 
exhibits a surprisingly high degree of variance across activities. Particularly market 
participation rates fluctuate strongly across households and seasons. 
Determinants of post-war diversification are primarily the indirect war effects. These include 
risk, the household life cycle position, household endowments, and transaction costs at the 
household and village levels. The strong role of life cycle effects indicates the importance of 
land abundance for the study of war-affected African farm households, especially via the 
negative effect of war on the marginal value of effort. The estimated determinants are 
consistent with the model proposed initially. They indicate a stronger emphasis on household 
and village characteristics in the determination of activity choices than standard farm 
household models would have suggested. 
Households may become risk takers near the absolute survival threshold by specializing in 
fewer activities and completely reducing their asset base to survive into the next season. This 
is primarily the result of the war-induced destruction of many alternative activity options. The 
past war has a strong effect on future outcomes for poor farm households. 
There is a difference between the determinants of a categorical decision to participate in 
output markets and the determinants of the continuous degree of market participation. The 
former is more affected by household life cycle, endowment and scale effects while the latter 
is strongly affected by the household risk experiences, social capital and village level 
21 variables. For instance, female-headed households have the same market participation pattern 
but a smaller market income share than male-headed households. 
Social activities are adopted by households which face only commodity-specific market 
failure. For households facing market failure across a whole range of products and services 
social contacts may not offer a significant alternative income source in the post-war, rural 
context. 
Farm households practice various non-market forms of activity diversification. The regression 
analysis focused on spatial diversification and social exchange as two such examples. 
Surprisingly, social exchange is quite limited after the war, in part due to the widespread 
absolute poverty in the sample area. Its determinants are similar to those of output market 
participation. Social exchange is thus no alternative to market participation for the poorest 
and most war-affected households. 
Village level effects are extremely important determinants of coping strategies. This implies 
that the government and donors can assist household coping strategies by providing public 
goods to enhance market participation and diversification opportunities. Post-war public 
policy must recognize the importance of local differences in the experience of war and 
prioritize assistance depending on the local war legacy.  
Finally, other important determinants of post-war coping strategies include household labor 
characteristics, asset endowments, farm size and social capital. Reconstruction policy should 
therefore aim to re-capitalize war-affected households, enhance human capital and reduce 
rural transaction costs to affect the whole range of diversification determinants. Lowering 
war-induced transaction costs will have strong positive effects on the market participation and 
off-farm earnings of agricultural households. 
22 Figure 1: The Two-Activity Farm Household Model 
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23 Table 1: The Variables of the FSP Survey 
Name Definition  Mean St  Err Min Max
Activity Variables     
COTTON  Does this household grow cotton in 1995  0.505 0.062  0 1
EXCHANGE  Natural log of the total $ value of remittances and gifts given and 
received per capita per household January till September 1995 
0.003 0.066 -4.026 3.006
INCOME  Net household income in $ in 1995  250.964 23.689  19.941 6,495.847
INCOMEPC  Net household income per capita in $ in 1995  37.130 3.609  4.500 463.989
PLOTFRAG  Natural log of the effective number of plots per hectare per 
household in 1995 
0.381 0.037 -2.507 3.567
SHAREON  Share of income derived from food and cash crops in % per 
household 
0.821 0.018 0.180 1
SHARESUB  Share of income derived from subsistence activities per 
household in 1995 
0.607 0.027 0.005 1
STATUS1  Type of household by output market participation in 1993-94  2.860 0.096  1 4
STATUS2  Type of household by output market participation in 1994-95  2.544 0.182  1 4
STATUS3  Type of household by crop market participation in 1994-95  0.786 0.055  0 1
TYPE1  Which type of income activities is the household undertaking in 
1995? 
2.860 0.106 1 4
TYPE2  Household is participating in off-farm activities in 1995?  0.438 0.049  0 1
Labor Variables     
ADULT  Number of non-dependent residents per household in mid-1995  5.573 0.330  1 15
ADULTSQU  Square of number of non-dependent residents per household in 
mid-1995 
37.262 4.266 1 225
AGEHEAD  Age of household head in years in mid-1995  40.928 1.354  19 83
AGEHEADSQU  Square of age of household head in years in mid-1995  1,830.025 111.895  361 6,889
AGEHH  Average age of household in years in early 1995  22.124 0.100  8.750 69
AGEHHSQU  Square of average age of household in years in early 1995  548.877 48.504  76.563 4.761
DEPEND  Number of dependent residents per household in mid-1995  1.888 0.111  0 7
DEPENDRATIO  Dependency ratio per household in mid-1994  0.275 0.016  0 1
DEPENDSQU  Square of number of dependent residents per household in mid-
1995 
5.534 0.523 0 49
EDUHH  Average number of years of education per household member in 
mid-1994 
0.964 0.061 0 4
EDUHHSQU  Square of average number of years of education per household 
member in mid-1994 
1.510 0.163 0 16
EDUMAX  Maximal number of years of effective education per household  3.582 0.213  0 12
EDUMAXSQU  Square of maximal number of years of effective education per 
household 
17.625 1.453 0 144
EDUMUM  Number of years of education of the mother per household  0.774 0.159  0 7
EDUMUMSQU  Square of number of years of education of the mother per 
household 
2.333 0.556 0 49
FEMALE  Number of females per household in 1994-96  3.472 0.198  0 10
FEMALESQU  Square of number of females per household in 1994-96  15.219 1.682  0 100
FEMHEAD  Was this a female-headed household in mid-1994?  0.013 0.006  0 1
ILLNOW  Total number days ill per household in 1995-96  21.772 2.351  0 215
ILLPAST  Total number days ill per household in 1994-95  46.066 10.599  0 433
MALE  Number of males per household in 1994-96  3.956 0.183  0 11
MALESQU  Square of number of males per household in 1994-96  19.638 1.673  0 121
TIMEHARVEST  Number of hours per month the wife spent collecting water in the 
harvest season in 1995 
24.629 3.274 0 270
TIMEHUNGRY  Number of hours per month the wife spent collecting water in the 
hungry season in 1995 
15.060 1.001 0 60
Land Variables     
AREALOG  Natural log of cultivated area per capita in 1994-95 per 
household in hectare 
-1.033 0.089 -3.337 1.065
AREATOTAL  Cultivated and fall area per capita per household in 1994-95 in 
hectare 
4.023 0.254 0.290 35
AREATOTALLOG  Natural log of cultivated and fall area per capita in 1994-95 per 
household in hectare 
-0.681 0.084 -2.773 1.131
DISTANCE  Distance to fields in minutes in 1995 per household  40.669 3.481  2 188.571
DISTANCESQU  Square of distance to fields in minutes in 1995 per household  2,312.797 324.291  4 35,559.180
PESTHIGH  Do more than 75% of all types of stored food crops suffer from 
pests? 
0.459 0.041 0 1
PESTLOW  Do more than 25% of all types of stored food crops suffer from 
pests? 
0.754 0.043 0 1
PESTMEDIUM  Do more than 50% of all types of stored food crops suffer from 
pests? 
0.593 0.049 0 1
RAIN  Proportion of cultivated area per household with lack of rain in 
1994-95  
0.296 0.049 0 1
SOILBAD  Very low soil quality per household?  0.286 0.047  0 1
SOILGOOD  Very high soil quality per household?  0.408 0.053  0 1
24 TENURE  Are you worried about household land tenure?  0.522 0.075  0 1
Asset Variables     
ANCESTOR  Does the household have ancestors who were buried locally?  0.844 0.041  0 1
ANIMAL  Household owns at least one large animal in late 1992?  0.112 0.027  0 1
ASSET  Value of assets in real 1996 US$ per household in late 1992  166.802 23.127  0 2,471.327
ASSETLOG  Natural log of value of assets in real 1996 US$ per household in 
late 1992 
2.925 0.254 0 7.813
AUTHORITY  Is household head in any position of traditional or political 
authority? 
0.071 0.013 0 1
DONATION  Has this household received food, seed or in-kind aid?  0.079 0.027  0 1
ORIGINMAN  Is this village the origin of the main man in the household?  0.678 0.049  0 1
ORIGINWOMAN  Is this village the origin of the main woman in the household?  0.652 0.050  0 1
TOOL  Number tools per household in mid-1995  6.175 0.242  0 27
TOOLPC  Number tools per capita per household in mid-1995  0.926 0.063  0 4
TOOLTYPE  Number of types of tools per household in mid-1995  2.899 0.115  0 5
Village Variables     
INFRASTR  Above average complaints about economic infrastructure and 
trade per village 
0.451 0.122 0 1
LABOR  Natural log of the number of hours of labor hired for farm work 
per village in 1995 
7.234 0.188 5.236 9.680
LABORPC  Natural log of the number of hours of labor hired per capita for 
farm work per village in 1995 
1.402 0.184 0.325 3.399
MARKET  Total crop sales by all village households in $ in 1993-94  3,564.409 572.805  525.158 13,398.710
MARKETLOG  Natural log of total crop sales by all village households in $ in 
1993-94 
7.531 0.231 4.987 10.044
MILL  Number of mills near household in mid-1995  2.242 0.308  1 15
YIELDCOTTON  Natural log of mean yield for cotton per village in kg per ha in 
1994-95 
6.351 0.134 4.934 7.249
YIELDMAIZE  Natural log of mean yield for maize per village in kg per ha in 
1994-95 
5.609 0.113 4.895 6.989
Control Variables     
PRICE14  Paasche price index for purchased food in late 1995 per 
household 
0.929 0.036 0.297 2.587
PRICE15  Paasche price index for purchased food in early 1996 per 
household 
1.128 0.073 0.333 3.554
PRICE23  Paasche price index for purchased non-food in mid-1995 per 
household 
1.050 0.059 0.510 2.420
PRICE24  Paasche price index for purchased non-food in late 1995 per 
household 
0.978 0.051 0.399 3.212
PRICE33  Paasche price index home produced food crops in mid-1995 per 
household 
1.044 0.066 0.456 2.736
PRICE34  Paasche price index home produced food crops in late 1995 per 
household 
1.096 0.152 0.375 2.473
PRICE35  Paasche price index home produced food crops in early 1996 
per household 
1.299 0.208 0.382 2.618
PRICEV1  Variance of PRICE1X  0.090 0.015  0.000 1.784
PRICEV2  Variance of PRICE2X  0.058 0.013  0.000 1.412
PRICEV3  Variance of PRICE3X  0.403 0.110  0.000 1.335
VILLAGE111  Does this household live in village 111?  0.042 0.030  0 1
VILLAGE112  Does this household live in village 112?  0.042 0.034  0 1
VILLAGE113  Does this household live in village 113?  0.039 0.028  0 1
VILLAGE114  Does this household live in village 114?  0.022 0.018  0 1
VILLAGE121  Does this household live in village 121?  0.104 0.091  0 1
VILLAGE122  Does this household live in village 122?  0.084 0.076  0 1
VILLAGE123  Does this household live in village 123?  0.169 0.118  0 1
VILLAGE214  Does this household live in village 214?  0.047 0.034  0 1
VILLAGE215  Does this household live in village 215?  0.034 0.029  0 1
VILLAGE221  Does this household live in village 221?  0.042 0.033  0 1
VILLAGE231  Does this household live in village 231?  0.035 0.032  0 1
VILLAGE232  Does this household live in village 232?  0.038 0.034  0 1
VILLAGE312  Does this household live in village 312?  0.095 0.086  0 1
VILLAGE313  Does this household live in village 313?  0.072 0.050  0 1
VILLAGE321  Does this household live in village 321?  0.082 0.063  0 1
VILLAGE332  Does this household live in village 332?  0.054 0.045  0 1
25 Table 2: Sources of Income 





On-Farm Income  Food Crop Income  59  6  65 
  Cash Crop Income  n.a.  17  17 
 Sub-Total  59 23  82 
Off-Farm Income  Entrepreneurial Income  n.a.  10  10 
  Social and Wage Income  2  6  8 
 Sub-Total  2 16  18 
Total   61 39  100 
 
Table 3: Household Income Shares in Sub-Saharan Africa 
% of Total Income  On-Farm Income  Off-Farm Income Social  Income 
  FSP SSA FSP SSA FSP SSA 
Maximum Survey  100 86  0  8  0  4 
Mean of All Surveys  82 63 16 28  2  8 
Median Survey  88 63 12 20  0  16 
Minimum Survey  18 37 82 51 45 11 
On-farm income includes food and cash crop income from home consumption and from crop sales. 
Off-farm income includes entrepreneurial and wage income. Social income includes remittances, 
transfers and donations. The three categories of income sum to give total income. The data reported 
under the headings “SSA” and “Mean of All Surveys” derived from 28 samples of farming households 
from Sub-Saharan Africa (abbreviated SSA) as calculated by Delgado and Siamwalla (1999: p. 134). 
Most surveys covered a single agricultural year within the period 1985-89. The other data under the 
headings “SSA” refer to the mean values of one survey as defined below. “Maximum Survey”, “Median 
Survey” and “Minimum Survey” refer to the income shares for the uplands area in Gambia in 1985-86, 
the Natural Region IV in Zimbabwe in 1988-89 and the Sahelian Zone in Senegal in 1988-90, 
respectively. The data under the “FSP” headings report the largest, mean, median and smallest value 
in the sample. 
 
Table 4: Change in Crop Market Participation Status by Household 
Estimated % of Population  Crop Market Participation in 1994-95 (STATUS2) 
Crop Market Participation in 
1993-94 (STATUS1) 












No Crop Market Participation  6.0  3.7 1.7 1.7  13.1 
Sell Food Crops Only  8.7  8.6  4.7 2.4  24.3 
Sell Food and Cash Crops  0.8 4.6  15.5  5.4  26.2 
Sell Cash Crops Only  6.0 7.8  10.1  12.5  36.4 




Table 5a: SHAREON Survey Linear Regression 
------------------------------------------------ 




      ADULT|  -.0175303  .0118692  -1.477  0.148 
   ADULTSQU|   .0024204  .0009244   2.618  0.013 
     DEPEND|   .0125307  .0126305   0.992  0.327 
  DEPENDSQU|   .0025772  .0022725   1.134  0.264 
    AGEHEAD|    .006284  .0050466   1.245  0.220 
 AGEHEADSQU|  -.0000475  .0000536  -0.886  0.381 
    ILLPAST|   .0001988  .0001155   1.722  0.093 
     EDUMAX|   .0339539  .0102777   3.304  0.002 
  EDUMAXSQU|  -.0043813  .0011937  -3.670  0.001 
     EDUMUM|   .0176925  .0125629   1.408  0.167 




    AREALOG|   .1348631  .0211524   6.376  0.000 
   DISTANCE|   -.001767   .000738  -2.394  0.022 
DISTANCESQU|   8.61e-06  4.37e-06   1.971  0.056 
       RAIN|  -.0573291  .0246265  -2.328  0.025 
     TENURE|  -.0846296  .0244551  -3.461  0.001 
   PESTHIGH|   .0313504  .0146427   2.141  0.039 




       TOOL|  -.0039323  .0025538  -1.540  0.132 
     ANIMAL|   .0735934  .0199542   3.688  0.001 
      ASSET|  -.0000986  .0000304  -3.240  0.002 




       MILL|   .0136944  .0036493   3.753  0.001 
   INFRASTR|   .2123507  .0261925   8.107  0.000 
      LABOR|  -.0103357  .0145806  -0.709  0.483 
  MARKETLOG|   .0200332  .0116077   1.726  0.092 




    PRICE15|  -.0971776  .0373487  -2.602  0.013 
    PRICE24|   .0846178  .0405244   2.088  0.043 
    PRICE35|   .1714816  .0263662   6.504  0.000 
 VILLAGE111|  -.0507845  .0453515  -1.120  0.270 
 VILLAGE114|  -.0732669  .0390354  -1.877  0.068 
 VILLAGE121|  -.1461745  .0244581  -5.977  0.000 
 VILLAGE122|  -.0271135  .0355936  -0.762  0.451 
 VILLAGE214|  -.0333665   .029371  -1.136  0.263 
 VILLAGE221|  -.0938319  .0479186  -1.958  0.057 
 VILLAGE231|   .0613586  .0244168   2.513  0.016 
 VILLAGE312|   .2388966  .0546979   4.368  0.000 
 VILLAGE321|   .0708184  .0612714   1.156  0.255 
 VILLAGE332|   -.124287   .036416  -3.413  0.002 
      _cons|   .0306183  .2308753   0.133  0.895 
------------------------------------------------ 
Table 5b: STATUS3 Survey Logistic Regression 
------------------------------------------------ 




DEPENDRATIO|   .0287958  .0524622  -1.947  0.059 
     EDUMAX|   7.590794    3.4112   4.510  0.000 




  AREATOTAL|   2.574034  .5561985   4.376  0.000 
   DISTANCE|   .8584758  .0369266  -3.548  0.001 
DISTANCESQU|   1.000807  .0002892   2.792  0.008 




   ANCESTOR|   .0626775    .03911  -4.439  0.000 
     ANIMAL|   37.14033  41.74628   3.216  0.003 
    PESTLOW|   .0985065  .0822063  -2.777  0.009 
       TOOL|   .8089222  .0505451  -3.394  0.002 




      LABOR|   .1352365   .075941  -3.563  0.001 




    PRICE14|   .0171836  .0332159  -2.102  0.043 
    PRICE15|   .0131806  .0175737  -3.247  0.003 
 VILLAGE111|   .7713355  1.550567  -0.129  0.898 
 VILLAGE114|   1.115601  1.186605   0.103  0.919 
 VILLAGE121|   162.0436  134.7856   6.117  0.000 
 VILLAGE123|   108.9385  88.13457   5.798  0.000 
 VILLAGE214|   97.52673   216.203   2.066  0.046 
 VILLAGE215|   1.788877  2.851237   0.365  0.717 
 VILLAGE221|   .1309925   .214853  -1.239  0.223 
 VILLAGE231|   1.189642  1.686851   0.122  0.903 
 VILLAGE312|   2.737442  4.129853   0.667  0.509 
 VILLAGE313|   54.29381  65.03203   3.335  0.002 
 VILLAGE321|   .1761884  .2013963  -1.519  0.138 
 VILLAGE332|   .0029133   .004347  -3.913  0.000 
------------------------------------------------ 
Table 5c: SHARESUB Survey Linear Regression 
------------------------------------------------ 




       ADULT|  -.0620192   .014571  -4.256 0.000 
    ADULTSQU|    .005219  .0009563   5.457 0.000 
     AGEHEAD|   .0054016  .0064104   0.843 0.405 
  AGEHEADSQU|  -.0000262  .0000698  -0.375 0.710 




    DISTANCE|   -.002181  .0008438  -2.585 0.014 
 DISTANCESQU|   .0000156  5.18E-06   3.008 0.005 
    PESTHIGH|   .0345854  .0162093   2.134 0.039 
        RAIN|  -.0959057  .0212148  -4.521 0.000 




    ANCESTOR|   .0875478  .0361663   2.421 0.020 
       ASSET|  -.0001499  .0000218  -6.870 0.000 
    DONATION|    .069358   .031295   2.216 0.033 




    INFRASTR|   .3000989  .0950152   3.158 0.003 
        MILL|   .0108649  .0053901   2.016 0.051 




     PRICE15|  -.0482654  .0260804  -1.851 0.072 
     PRICE33|   .1072565  .0550026   1.950 0.058 
     PRICE35|   .2440533  .0410486   5.945 0.000 
  VILLAGE111|  -.0391956  .0409281  -0.958 0.344 
  VILLAGE112|  -.2499654  .1052864  -2.374 0.023 
  VILLAGE121|  -.1738759  .1001921  -1.735 0.091 
  VILLAGE122|  -.0038679  .0928867  -0.042 0.967 
  VILLAGE214|  -.3142226  .0849659  -3.698 0.001 
  VILLAGE215|  -.0839465  .0652356  -1.287 0.206 
  VILLAGE221|  -.1436878  .0974528  -1.474 0.148 
  VILLAGE231|  -.1358108  .0361795  -3.754 0.001 
  VILLAGE232|  -.2390645  .0904007  -2.644 0.012 
  VILLAGE312|   .1165941  .0632936   1.842 0.073 
  VILLAGE313|  -.2766398  .1012645  -2.732 0.009 
  VILLAGE332|  -.3427917  .0532544  -6.437 0.000 
       _cons|  -.4481974  .3850826  -1.164 0.252 
------------------------------------------------  
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Table 5d: COTTON Survey Logistic Regression 
------------------------------------------------ 




      AGEHH|   1.376024  .1910292   2.299  0.027 
   AGEHHSQU|   .9934084  .0025573  -2.569  0.014 
     EDUMUM|   3.129616  1.266483   2.819  0.008 
  EDUMUMSQU|   .7496746  .0727275  -2.970  0.005 
     ILLNOW|   .9652124  .0108998  -3.135  0.003 
    ILLPAST|   .9912164  .0025246  -3.464  0.001 
       MALE|   .5597388  .2839412  -1.144  0.260 
    MALESQU|   1.105997  .0575611   1.936  0.060 




 PESTMEDIUM|   2.372034  1.138485   1.800  0.080 




   ASSETLOG|   1.251959  .1216474   2.313  0.026 
  AUTHORITY|   17.15189  14.81306   3.291  0.002 
ORIGINWOMAN|   2.372534  1.140233   1.798  0.080 
     TOOLPC|   3.776268  2.350207   2.135  0.039 




    LABORPC|   .1016133  .0766145  -3.033  0.004 
     MARKET|    .999751  .0000997  -2.497  0.017 




    PRICE14|   .0272843  .0445939  -2.204  0.034 
    PRICE23|   .0173761  .0245084  -2.873  0.007 
    PRICE33|   706.3688  906.6695   5.111  0.000 
    PRICEV1|   .1058543  .0928204  -2.561  0.014 
    PRICEV2|   5268.844  21070.95   2.143  0.038 
 VILLAGE111|   1.696154   1.48256   0.604  0.549 
 VILLAGE114|   .6141628  .7819324  -0.383  0.704 
 VILLAGE121|   .0018552  .0029422  -3.966  0.000 
 VILLAGE123|   .0173304  .0217999  -3.224  0.003 
 VILLAGE215|   1.129094  1.371738   0.100  0.921 
 VILLAGE221|   .0040708  .0082824  -2.705  0.010 
 VILLAGE231|   6.770843  6.193095   2.091  0.043 
 VILLAGE232|   .0524096  .0732251  -2.110  0.041 
 VILLAGE312|   .0510358  .0641789  -2.366  0.023 
 VILLAGE313|   .0089072  .0169644  -2.479  0.018 
 VILLAGE321|   .6448328  1.109613  -0.255  0.800 
 VILLAGE332|    .014928  .0146558  -4.283  0.000 
------------------------------------------------ 
Table 5e: PLOTFRAG Survey Linear Regression 
------------------------------------------------ 




     FEMALE|  -.1625669  .0847035  -1.919  0.062 
  FEMALESQU|   .0147468  .0084677   1.742  0.089 
       MALE|   .1018678  .0519252   1.962  0.057 
    MALESQU|  -.0112937  .0045526  -2.481  0.018 
DEPENDRATIO|   .4757412  .2133143   2.230  0.032 
     ILLNOW|   .0036647  .0016294   2.249  0.030 
 TIMEHUNGRY|   -.007672  .0038465  -1.995  0.053 
      EDUHH|  -.3347204  .1537147  -2.178  0.036 




   SOILGOOD|  -.2757984  .1036334  -2.661  0.011 




       TOOL|  -.0442351  .0203263  -2.176  0.036 
   TOOLTYPE|   .0777572  .0435451   1.786  0.082 
    ANIMAL1|  -.0338432  .0183732  -1.842  0.073 
   ASSETLOG|  -.0414716  .0171049  -2.425  0.020 




  MARKETLOG|  -.1725465   .064982  -2.655  0.011 




    PRICE14|   .6917875   .199938   3.460  0.001 
    PRICE34|  -.5916754  .2233774  -2.649  0.012 
    PRICEV3|   1.643143   .736299   2.232  0.031 
 VILLAGE111|    .205873  .2040212   1.009  0.319 
 VILLAGE112|    .017506  .1238662   0.141  0.888 
 VILLAGE114|   .0664956  .2013503   0.330  0.743 
 VILLAGE122|   .1408495  .1724742   0.817  0.419 
 VILLAGE123|  -.6362232  .4834455  -1.316  0.196 
 VILLAGE214|   .4567095     .1891   2.415  0.021 
 VILLAGE221|    .884655  .3493551   2.532  0.015 
 VILLAGE231|   .4549796  .1221893   3.724  0.001 
 VILLAGE232|   .3332782  .1573084   2.119  0.041 
 VILLAGE312|  -.4913146  .8176324  -0.601  0.551 
 VILLAGE313|  -.2091772  .2925614  -0.715  0.479 
 VILLAGE321|   1.042982  .2701278   3.861  0.000 
 VILLAGE332|   .3309121   .138541   2.389  0.022 
      _cons|  -1.538881  .7403682  -2.079  0.044 
------------------------------------------------ 
Table 5f: EXCHANGE Survey Linear Regression 
------------------------------------------------- 




      FEMALE|  -.1528568  .1025797  -1.490  0.144 
   FEMALESQU|   .0281111  .0097408   2.886  0.006 
        MALE|  -.2183613  .0838649  -2.604  0.013 
     MALESQU|    .027045  .0071104   3.804  0.000 
     AGEHEAD|   -.067267  .0245598  -2.739  0.009 
  AGEHEADSQU|   .0006875  .0002109   3.259  0.002 
       AGEHH|   .0751504  .0264236   2.844  0.007 
    AGEHHSQU|  -.0007288  .0004521  -1.612  0.115 
      ILLNOW|  -.0075396  .0016817  -4.483  0.000 
  TIMEHUNGRY|  -.0092342  .0041648  -2.217  0.033 
      EDUMUM|    .183457  .1201554   1.527  0.135 




AREATOTALLOG|   .4406405  .0948022   4.648  0.000 
     SOILBAD|  -.3099117  .1590303  -1.949  0.059 
    DISTANCE|  -.0237604  .0095276  -2.494  0.017 
 DISTANCESQU|   .0001368  .0000433   3.160  0.003 




     ANIMAL1|    .025918  .0099952   2.593  0.013 
       ASSET|   .0005363  .0002054   2.611  0.013 




   MARKETLOG|    .297438  .0796022   3.737  0.001 




     PRICE34|   .5642734  .3203648   1.761  0.086 
     PRICEV3|  -1.930588  .7571604  -2.550  0.015 
  VILLAGE111|   .2642883   .285374   0.926  0.360 
  VILLAGE112|   .3887507  .1439718   2.700  0.010 
  VILLAGE114|  -.8589053  .2397054  -3.583  0.001 
  VILLAGE122|  -.1099731  .1672159  -0.658  0.515 
  VILLAGE123|   .9248078  .5520748   1.675  0.102 
  VILLAGE214|  -1.055936  .3444332  -3.066  0.004 
  VILLAGE221|    .274787  .5125865   0.536  0.595 
  VILLAGE231|   .3463101  .1669918   2.074  0.045 
  VILLAGE232|  -.2444901  .1860446  -1.314  0.196 
  VILLAGE312|    1.32119  1.011853   1.306  0.199 
  VILLAGE313|   .6358047  .4339728   1.465  0.151 
  VILLAGE321|  -.3982447  .2584977  -1.541  0.131 
  VILLAGE332|  -.0218833  .1732487  -0.126  0.900 
       _cons|   5.816203   .965142   6.026  0.000 
-------------------------------------------------  
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